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The Ukrainian “anti-corruption trio”
In Ukraine, efforts to build a system of institutions 
to combat corruption among state officials last-
ed five years. In May 2019, President Zelensky’s 
administration ’inherited’ the system of bodies 
tasked with combating corruption among state 
officials. It had been created during Petro Poro-
shenko’s presidency in response to pressure from 
Western lenders and Ukrainian activists. Back in 
April 2015, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau 
of Ukraine (NABU) was established as a special 
service to combat this type of crime within the 
state administration. In order to boost the effec-
tiveness of this institution, in December 2015 the 
Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAP) 
was established to draw up indictments on the 
basis of evidence compiled and provided by NABU, 
and to bring them before court.
To ensure the independence of anti-corruption 
institutions, a special procedure for selecting 
their heads was adopted (by an open competition 
in which only individuals with an untarnished 
reputation can participate) and a provision was 
enacted to prevent them from being quickly dis-
missed on political grounds. For four years, the 
effectiveness of NABU and SAP was minor because 
their indictments were filed with unreformed and 
corrupt common courts. To improve the situation, 
the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine (HACC) 
was created. Although the law came into effect 
Ukraine: attempted attack on anti-corruption bodies?
Piotr Żochowski, Sławomir Matuszak, Tadeusz Iwański
The high susceptibility of Ukrainian officials to corruption has been one factor affecting the condition 
of the Ukrainian state. Since 2014, the government has managed to create several anti-corruption 
institutions whose independence from the executive is one of the main conditions for Ukraine to 
continue receiving financial assistance from the West. Over the past year, this system has become 
more robust, and the first sentences were issued in cases involving state officials caught up in 
corruption schemes. However, despite President Volodymyr Zelensky’s declared determination to 
combat corruption among state officials, recent months have seen measures that may weaken the 
key institutions established to combat corruption; this would be tantamount to reversing reforms in 
this field. These actions have been initiated by politicians and oligarchs intending to make the fight 
against corruption less effective. This has triggered major concern from Western donors (who are 
responding to this by threatening to halt financial support and to suspend the visa-free regime) and 
from Ukrainian civil society.
OSW Commentary     NUMBER 355 2
in June 2018, until autumn 2019 the operation 
of this body was disrupted due to the fact that 
all corruption indictments, regardless of their 
substance, were filed with this court and this 
prevented it from examining the most important 
cases in an efficient manner.
Streamlining the anti-corruption 
system
Streamlining the operation of HACC was an un-
questioned success for President Zelensky, which 
he achieved at the beginning of his term. He did 
this by issuing a decision that NABU and SAP 
should only file indictments regarding corruption 
among senior state officials with this court. The 
remaining cases were to be examined by the 
relevant departments of the public prosecutor’s 
office. Another presidential initiative intended 
to streamline the system built to combat corrup-
tion involved enacting the law in autumn 2019 
to regulate the legal status of individuals who 
report information on corruption-related crimes. 
In this law, these individuals are referred to as 
“exposers” (whistle-blowers). Whenever they are 
involved in the practice they intend to report, 
they are absolved of criminal responsibility. In-
dividuals who report a corruption-related crime 
in which they were not personally involved will 
receive 10% of the value of funds recovered by 
the state. In addition, the law authorised NABU to 
independently use surveillance techniques (wire-
tapping, visual surveillance) without having to 
apply to the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) for 
permission. President Poroshenko’s administration 
had successfully blocked the introduction of these 
measures for several years.
However, resistance from numerous political 
groups, officials at various echelons and business 
circles continues to be an obstacle to the smooth 
operation of anti-corruption institutions. These 
groups are accustomed to creating and using 
mechanisms that help them obtain favourable 
administrative decisions. Oligarchs and the rep-
resentatives of the political elite associated with 
them are particularly interested in undermining 
the effectiveness of the bodies established to 
combat abuse. They fear that, once the anti-cor-
ruption system becomes more robust, it will make 
it difficult for them to continue their corrupt 
practices at the interface of big business and the 
state administration.
Anti-corruption bodies under fire
In September 2020, one event that triggered a crit-
ical reaction from the Western countries and civil 
society organisations which monitor the course of 
reforms in Ukraine involved the Ukrainian parlia-
ment electing seven out of the eleven members 
of the selection committee formed to nominate 
a candidate for the head of SAP. This post has 
remained vacant since August 2020, when Nazar 
Holodnitsky resigned due to his conflict with the 
Prosecutor General. The line-up of the committee 
has raised concerns from anti-corruption activists, 
a portion of the opposition, and of the West. These 
groups of critics argue that committee members 
were recruited taking into account their party 
membership and that they failed to fully meet the 
criteria of professionalism and integrity. This in 
turn offers no guarantee that their attitude during 
the selection committee’s work will not be biased, 
which may result in an individual susceptible to 
pressure from politicians being selected as the 
head of SAP.
In addition, on 16 September the Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine ruled that some provisions of 
the law on NABU are unconstitutional. The ruling 
stated that the president’s powers authorising him 
to establish NABU and to appoint and dismiss its 
head have not been defined in the Basic Law. This 
was another ruling by the Constitutional Court in 
which the court requested the Verkhovna Rada 
to prepare and enact a new law on the National 
Anti-Corruption Bureau. In the previous ruling, 
issued on 28 August, the court considered that 
Oligarchs and the representatives 
of the political elite associated with 
them are particularly interested in 
undermining the effectiveness of 
the bodies established to combat 
corruption.
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Artyom Sytnik had been unconstitutionally ap-
pointed (by President Poroshenko) to his position 
as head of NABU. There is a risk that the new 
wording of the law will contain provisions which 
will make the National Anti-Corruption Bureau 
and its head more vulnerable to political pressure. 
The Constitutional Court has obligated the MPs to 
enact this new law within three months.
The initiators of the most recent motion to the Con-
stitutional Court included fifty MPs from the Serv-
ant of the People parliamentary group1. This group 
has been associated with oligarch Ihor Kolomoysky, 
and representatives of the pro-Russian Opposition 
Platform – For Life (whose leaders include Viktor 
Medvedchuk, a politician with close political and 
business ties with Russia). It seems that this tactical 
alliance of MPs representing the two parliamen-
tary groupings is based on the similar intentions 
of both sides. Medvedchuk is mainly interested in 
supporting activities that could potentially trigger 
a political crisis in Ukraine and in Ukraine’s relations 
with the West, and in undermining the president’s 
position. In recent months, Kolomoysky (who is 
the subject of an FBI investigation into money 
laundering in the US) has publicly expressed de 
facto pro-Russian views by calling for Ukraine 
to break off its cooperation with the IMF and to 
declare insolvency. The MPs associated with Kolo-
moysky support the activities intended to reduce 
the effectiveness of the anti-corruption system. 
It seems that their main goal is to pressurise the 
Servant of the People (which is at present ruling the 
country independently) into establishing a formal 
coalition with the For the Future parliamentary 
group (which Kolomoysky controls) and to install 
its representatives in the government.
1 The parliamentary representation of the Servant of the 
People is highly diverse. It includes MPs representing various 
interest groups, including oligarchic interest groups. This 
results, for example, from the fact that, ahead of the 2019 
parliamentary elections, the electoral lists were compiled 
in an ad hoc manner.
Another development suggesting that a coordi-
nated attack on the system of anti-corruption 
institutions has been launched to disrupt their 
operation involved an attempt to challenge the 
constitutionality of the operation of HACC. On 
22 July 2020, 49 MPs (representing Medvedchuk’s 
grouping and the For the Future grouping) filed 
a motion regarding this claim. The arguments 
presented in the motion suggest that HACC was 
established in a manner which seriously violates 
the principles of the judicial system defined in the 
Ukrainian constitution.
The anti-corruption system 
in a legal trap
The practice of bringing motions to the Constitu-
tional Court in an attempt to disrupt the operation 
of the system of anti-corruption institutions is 
a consequence of mistakes made back when the 
subsequent versions of the wording of the laws 
were being debated in parliament. Back then, in-
sufficient effort was made to ensure that the new 
provisions were consistent with the constitution. 
This is why the rulings of the Constitutional Court 
in the NABU case do not give rise to legal doubts, 
and the problematic issue of the constitutional 
empowerment of the president to appoint and 
dismiss the head of this institution had already 
been raised. In autumn 2019, President Zelensky 
himself made an attempt to amend the provisions 
of the constitution to clarify his powers regarding 
NABU. However, his proposal failed to garner the 
required parliamentary majority (300 MPs), and it 
was rejected by almost the entire opposition due 
to MPs’ fear that the presidential centre of power 
intends to take over supervision of this institution.
Alongside this, the ruling of the Constitutional 
Court, which paves the way for enacting a new law 
on NABU, triggers the risk that this independent 
institution may become a body subordinate to 
the executive, and that the Verkhovna Rada may 
gain greater control of its operation. At present, 
it is difficult to quickly dismiss the head of NABU 
for political grounds. This can happen at the re-
quest of a third of MPs – for example following 
a legally valid judgement stating that the head 
Attempts to undermine the consti-
tutionality of anti-corruption bodies 
result from mistakes made during 
the legislative process.
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of NABU has committed a crime or in the wake 
of a negative assessment of his work arising from 
an independent audit to evaluate NABU’s opera-
tion. However, the provisions of the new law may 
weaken the position of the head of NABU, for ex-
ample by expanding the list of instances in which 
the institution’s head could be dismissed, This in 
turn would make this person more susceptible to 
influence exerted by politicians. 
The last year has seen an increase in the effective-
ness of the anti-corruption system. This is evident 
in the rulings issued by HACC. They concerned 
16 crimes committed, for example by judges (ac-
cepting a bribe in exchange for issuing a specific 
ruling), former MPs (tax fraud) and managers of 
large industrial plants (money laundering and the 
theft of company property). Only one acquittal 
was pronounced. In addition, lawsuits against the 
incumbent mayor of Odessa, Gennadiy Trukhanov, 
and Mykola Martynenko (a senior figure of the 
National Front party and who had been a mem-
ber of the ruling coalition back in 2014–2019) 
are pending. Possible convictions of such promi-
nent representatives of the Ukrainian elite would 
be unprecedented. Thus far, several important 
politicians have been detained. However, they 
have always ultimately managed to avoid a prison 
sentence.
The activity of NABU and SAP has triggered con-
cern on the part of several Ukrainian oligarchs 
who argue, not without reason, that investiga-
tions carried out by these bodies pose a threat to 
their interests. These investigations concern, for 
example, an attempt by Hryhory and Ihor Surkis 
to receive unjustified compensation for lost assets 
in PrivatBank, and their alleged attempts to bribe 
the judges.2 The case questioning the legality of 
Ukraine adopting the so-called Rotterdam+ for-
mula in 2016 has a similar context. This formula 
involved a plan to increase the price of coal used 
to produce energy by tying it to the API-2 index 
(its price at the Port of Rotterdam). Beneficiaries 
2 ‘Суркисы vs Приватбанк: НАБУ открыло дело из-за по-
пыток завладеть имуществом банка’, Экономическая 
правда, 8 September 2020, www.epravda.com.ua.
of the application of this formula included the 
oligarch Rinat Akhmetov and, according to media 
reports,3 the then President Petro Poroshenko. 
NABU estimated the losses suffered by the state 
treasury at 39 billion hryvnias (around US$ 1.4 bil-
lion).4 Actions carried out by NABU regarding 
these cases are being hampered by the General 
Public Prosecutor’s Office and by the SBU, which 
are using procedural pretexts to postpone taking 
them to court.
An ambivalent reaction from 
the president…
In official statements, President Zelensky assures 
the public that he is ready to continue the fight 
against corruption and to maintain the conditions 
that guarantee the stable operation of the insti-
tutions established to counteract such practices. 
Although there is no direct evidence that the 
president or his collaborators are behind the at-
tempts to undermine the anti-corruption system, 
there are certain indications that this may be the 
case. The president’s insignificant support for 
the independence of anti-corruption institutions, 
alongside his failure to offer a critical response to 
recent measures by MPs, are noteworthy. In addi-
tion, he has failed to take a clear stance regarding 
the direction of legislative changes intended to 
guarantee transparent rules for the selection of 
candidates for senior positions.
This may suggest that the President’s Office in-
tends to use the attack launched by Medvedchuk’s 
and Kolomoysky’s groupings to replace the heads 
of these institutions, with ones loyal to the pres-
3 И. Верстюк, ‘Формула успеха: Зачем Ахметов и Поро-
шенко придумали Роттердам плюс — расследование’, 
НВ, 2 June 2017, www.nv.ua.
4 С. Головньов, ‘Чи будуть засуджені організатори «Роттер-
дам плюс»’, Бизнес Цензор, 3 August 2020, biz.censor.net.
The president’s rhetoric is charac-
terised by insignificant support for 
the independence of anti-corruption 
institutions and by the absence of 
criticism regarding actions carried 
out by MPs.
OSW Commentary     NUMBER 355 5
ident. In order to achieve this, it cites the need 
to amend the legislation regarding NABU and to 
ensure the rotation of officials holding the office 
of head of SAP. The president’s motivation was 
similar in March 2020, when Prosecutor General 
Ruslan Riaboshapka was dismissed. He openly 
objected to pressure from the President’s Office 
requesting him to launch criminal proceedings 
against Petro Poroshenko, arguing that there was 
insufficient evidence to do so. He was replaced 
with Iryna Venediktova who is more loyal to Pres-
ident Zelensky.
…and unambivalent reactions from 
the international community
The possibility of introducing unfavourable chang-
es to the system of institutions established to 
combat corruption has exposed the Ukrainian 
leadership to criticism from the West. Ambassa-
dors of the G7 countries issued a statement5 un-
derscoring the need to maintain the independence 
of the structure of anti-corruption bodies and 
pointed out that this is a necessary condition for 
Ukraine to continue to receive financial support. 
Alongside this, following his visit to Ukraine, on 
22 September the EU’s High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, 
emphasised the importance of transparent and 
politically neutral procedures for the selection of 
new heads of anti-corruption institutions in the 
context of continued cooperation between Kyiv 
and Brussels. On 5 October, an open letter from 
a group of MEPs to Davyd Arakhamia, the head 
of the Servant of the People parliamentary group, 
was published. In their letter, the MEPs warned 
that the EU may view the issue of the selection of 
the head of SAP and the situation around NABU 
as grounds for suspending its financial support 
to Ukraine. In addition, they announced that the 
visa-free regime may be suspended for selected 
oligarchs and policy makers.6
5 ‘Посли G7 оприлюднили заяву щодо ситуації довкола 
обрання нового керівника САП’, Європейська правда, 
3 September 2020, www.eurointegration.com.ua.
6 V. von Cramon, M. Gahler, R. Juknevičienė, ‘Open Letter to 
Arakhamia – Head of Sluha Narodu’, 5 October 2020, www.
violavoncramon.eu.
The crisis around NABU and SAP is one of several 
reasons for the IMF to withhold its financial assis-
tance to Ukraine. The stand-by loan programme 
agreed in June 2020 envisaged a credit line worth 
a total of US$ 5 billion spread over 18 months.7 
Having received the first loan instalment worth 
US$ 2.1 billion, in June 2020 the government in 
Kyiv brought about a change in the line-up of the 
executive body of the National Bank of Ukraine, 
whose independence is among the most fun-
damental issues for the IMF. Another fact that 
raised the IMF’s concern involved the court ruling 
in favour of the Surkis brothers in the case con-
cerning PrivatBank compensation. Although the 
Supreme Court invalidated this ruling, a number 
of similar cases are still pending in Ukraine’s com-
mon courts. The de facto suspension (albeit not 
breaking off) of Ukraine’s cooperation with the 
IMF is tantamount to freezing the payments by 
other donors, in particular the EU (an instalment 
of macro-financial assistance worth 600 million 
euros), and the loans from the World Bank (US$ 
1 billion). Although the situation in Ukraine is not 
as difficult as it was back in 2014–2015, the crisis 
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has triggered 
a recession in the first half of 2020 (-6.5% of GDP) 
and an increased demand for external funding.
For the time being, the announced possible sus-
pension of the visa-free regime should be viewed 
as a warning. Borrell’s statements suggest that 
Brussels may decide to launch this procedure only 
if it is convinced that the Ukrainian authorities 
are deliberately dismantling the anti-corruption 
system.8 A joint statement issued by the EU and 
Ukraine following the 6 October summit in Brus-
7 S. Matuszak, ‘Nowe porozumienie Ukrainy z Międzynarodo-
wym Funduszem Walutowym’, OSW, 10 June 2020, www.
osw.waw.pl.
8 С. Сидоренко, ‘Візит із натяком на безвіз: що сказав і про 
що промовчав у Києві шеф дипломатії ЄС’, Європейська 
правда, 23 September 2020, www.eurointegration.com.ua.
For Ukraine, halting its cooperation 
with the IMF is tantamount to freez-
ing the payments from other donors, 
including the EU, and the loans from 
the World Bank.
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sels is similar in tone.9 The open letter from MEPs, 
for its part, only mentions oligarchs and policy 
makers who hamper the effective fight against 
corruption. The possible suspension of the vi-
sa-free regime would have highly negative social 
consequences because most economic migrants 
from Ukraine travel to the EU (to Poland in par-
ticular), thus taking advantage of visa-free move-
ment. It would also have a major negative impact 
on the government’s approval rating and would 
be tantamount to eliminating one of Ukraine’s 
greatest achievements on its way to European 
integration. In addition, a decline in remittances 
sent from abroad would pose a serious problem 
to Ukraine’s balance of payments (in 2019 the 
value of these remittances stood at US$ 12 billion).
President Zelensky’s anti-corruption 
dilemmas
The fight against corruption is among the most 
important tests for Zelensky’s presidency. On 
the one hand, his major involvement in this fight 
could help to reverse or at least to slow down 
a trend spelling a decline in his approval rating. 
In public opinion polls, the respondents point to 
corruption as the problem which has the strong-
est impact on Ukraine’s unfavourable domestic 
situation.10 On the other hand, the fight against 
9 Joint statement following the 22nd EU-Ukraine Summit, 
6 October 2020, The European Council, 6 October 2020, 
www.consilium.europa.eu.
10 In a poll conducted by the Sociological Group “Rating” 
published on 7 September 2020, 48% of the respondents 
said that corruption is Ukraine’s most serious problem. It 
was followed by the war in the east of the country (43%). 
Since 2015, the results of most polls conducted in Ukraine 
have been similar. ‘Опитування IRI: Суспільно-політичні 
погляди в Україні’, Рейтинг, 7 September 2020, www.
ratinggroup.ua.
corruption will undoubtedly aggravate the conflict 
with oligarchs, a portion of the political elite and 
officials at various echelons, which may trigger 
a serious crisis of state.
The present attempt to weaken NABU and SAP is 
proof of the effectiveness of these institution’s 
operations which pose a direct threat to the 
interests of oligarchs and senior state officials. 
However, the role of the president in this pro-
cess is unclear. Unlike his predecessor, President 
Zelensky has not been accused of reaping benefits 
from corruption. However, his failure – whether 
deliberate or not – to carry out decisive actions 
is making the risk that anti-corruption bodies 
may lose their independence all the more like-
ly. The shift in the president’s attitude towards 
anti-corruption bodies which has been evident 
over the last year is also symptomatic. While in 
the first months after taking office he gave these 
institutions a free hand and only demanded that 
they should be effective, since spring 2020 he has 
distanced himself from them, in particular from 
actions carried out by NABU.
At present, it is difficult to determine whether the 
current status of NABU and SAP will be under-
mined. The main factors preventing this are the 
tough stance of the West and Kyiv’s dependence 
on external financial support. Although at present 
Ukraine has large currency reserves (US$ 29 billion), 
it also faces the need to repay its previous loans,11 
and it will only be able to avoid insolvency if it 
continues its financial cooperation with the West.
11 According to information provided by the Ministry of 
Finance, by the end of 2020 Ukraine is obliged to pay 
87 billion hryvnias (US$ 3.1 billion), and in 2021 421 billion 
hryvnias (US$ 15 billion).
